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Rights of Persons with Disabilities: The Difficult Road From Guardianship to 
Supported Decision-Making
By Robert D. Dinerstein*
intrODuctiOn
In deceptively simple language, Article 12 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Dis-abilities (“CRPD”), Equal Recognition before the law, 
provides that “States Parties shall recognize that persons with 
disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others 
in all aspects of life.”1 If, as is clear from the deliberations that 
produced this article, Article 12’s use of the term “legal capacity” 
includes not simply the capacity to have rights (or passive capacity) 
but also the capacity to act or exercise one’s rights, an impor-
tant question that arises is how to address the circumstances of 
individuals with disabilities who may not be able to exercise 
their legal capacity without some kind of assistance or interven-
tion. Article 12(3) addresses this question in language that once 
again seems straightforward and 
uncontroversial: “States Parties 
shall take appropriate measures 
to provide access by persons 
with disabilities to the support 
they may require in exercising 
their legal capacity.”2 Yet this 
use of the word “support,” and 
the related concept of supported 
decision making, represents noth-
ing less than a “paradigm shift”3 
away from well-established but 
increasingly discredited notions 
of substituted decision making. 
Rhetorical identification of the 
shift from substituted to sup-
ported decision making, however, is one thing; understanding 
what these terms mean, and fully implementing a regime truly 
oriented toward supporting rather than supplanting the decision-
making rights of people with disabilities, is quite another matter. 
To paraphrase one commentator, with Article 12 “on the books,” 
now comes the hard part.4
In this essay, after providing some background on Article 12 
and its relationship to core values immanent in the CRPD as a 
whole, I set out some of the characteristics of guardianship — the 
primary form of substituted decision making employed around 
the world — and its alternatives. I then explore the concept of 
supported decision making and some of the ways in which it 
has, or might function. Finally, I discuss some of the beginning 
efforts to come to terms with the meaning of supported decision 
making in which States Parties, non-governmental organizations, 
and the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities are 
engaged. Early indications are that there continues to be sub-
stantial confusion, at least on the part of States Parties, over the 
meaning of supported decision 
making, to say nothing of the 
fitful process some countries are 
experiencing in changing their 
laws to provide for this form 
of assistance to individuals with 
disabilities. I will conclude with 
some observations about steps 
people with disabilities, NGOs, 
policy-makers, and others might 
take to hasten States’ embrace of 
supported decision making and 
make the exciting promise of the 
CRPD a reality for people with 
disabilities.
article 12 anD its iMpOrtance
As Amita Dhanda5 and others6 have documented, Article 
12 was one of the most hotly contested articles to be consid-
ered during the treaty deliberation process. In addition to the 
controversy surrounding the provision of support, the nature of 
substituted decision-making arrangements, and the kinds of 
“due process” protections that should be in place with respect 
to legal capacity, a key dispute was whether there needed to be 
a distinction between the legal capacity for rights and the legal 
capacity to act.7 After much back-and-forth discussion, an alter-
native draft, and a last-minute footnote that purported to reject 
the concept of legal capacity to act on linguistic grounds, the 
States Parties adopted Article 12 and its commitment to recog-
nizing legal capacity to the fullest extent.8
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9Article 12’s emphasis on legal capacity and the choice-
making that underlies the concept, as well as its statement that 
“persons with disabilities have the right to recognition every-
where as persons before the law,”9 resonates with other impor-
tant provisions of the CRPD. The Preamble to the Convention 
recognizes “the importance for persons with disabilities of their 
individual autonomy and independence, including the freedom 
to make their own choices,”10 and adds that “persons with 
disabilities should have the opportunity to be actively involved 
in decision-making processes about policies and programmes, 
including those directly concerning them.”11 Article 3 of the 
CRPD proper, General Principles, includes “respect for inher-
ent dignity, individual autonomy including the freedom to make 
one’s own choices, and independence of persons” and “full and 
effective participation and inclusion in society.”12 Article 5’s call 
for equality and non-discrimination emphasizes that “all persons 
are equal before and under the law” and that States may need 
to provide reasonable accommodations to ensure that equal-
ity and non-discrimination are achieved.13 Article 19, Living 
independently and being included in the community, provides that 
“States Parties . . . recognize the equal right of all persons with 
disabilities to live in the community, with choices equal to others” 
and must ensure that “[p]ersons with disabilities have the oppor-
tunity to choose their place of residence and where and with 
whom they live on an equal basis with others. . . .”14 Article 23, 
Respect for home and the family, requires non-discrimination 
“against persons with disabilities in all matters relating to mar-
riage, family, parenthood, and relationships, on an equal basis 
with others” and ensures that people with disabilities of mar-
riageable age have the rights to marry and found a family.15 
Article 26, Habilitation and Rehabilitation, requires States Parties 
to adopt measures to enable people with disabilities to achieve 
and maintain “maximum independence” and “full inclusion and 
participation in all aspects of life.”16 Plainly, if an individual 
with disability is deemed not to have legal capacity, the person’s 
ability to make choices, achieve maximum independence and be 
fully included in the community is fatally compromised.
The requirement in Article 12(3) that States Parties provide 
access to whatever supports people with disabilities need to exer-
cise their capacity reflects the critical insight that even people 
with the most significant disabilities have legal capacity and are 
covered by the CRPD. The provision builds on the statement in the 
Preamble that “recogniz[es] the need to promote and protect the 
human rights of all persons with disabilities, including those who 
require more intensive support.17 Article 12(4) expands on the 
desired characteristics of support by providing that, among other 
things, capacity-related measures “respect the rights, will, and 
preferences of the person” and “are proportional and tailored to 
the person’s circumstances. . . .”18 Article 12 is not the only place 
in the CRPD where support in one or more forms (including 
personal assistance) appears; Articles 19 (Living independently 
and being included in the community), 20 (Personal mobility), 
24 (2)(d), (e) (Education), among others, all include references 
to the need to provide support to people with disabilities.19 The 
salience of support is a concrete expression of the social, inter-
active model of disability that animates the entire Convention 
and sees disability as not a thing in and of itself but rather as a 
product of the interaction between an individual and his or her 
built and attitudinal environments.20
The importance of Article 12’s insistence on the recogni-
tion of legal capacity of people with disabilities also must be 
understood in the context of the historical treatment of people 
with disabilities and their presumed inability to make decisions 
about their lives. Society assumes that adults of typical intel-
ligence, psychosocial functioning, and sensory ability are able 
to engage in all aspects of life — deciding where to live, whom 
(or whether) to marry, how to spend one’s money (or to whom 
to leave it), for whom to vote — on an autonomous basis, with 
whatever assistance they choose to seek out and consider in their 
decision making. But for adults with disabilities, the picture has 
been and continues to be quite different. States have assumed 
that the mere status of having an intellectual or psychosocial 
disability (or some sensory disabilities21) provides a sufficient 
basis to presume that the individual is unable to participate fully 
and autonomously in society, in other words, that the individual 
lacks the legal capacity to exercise his or her rights. People with 
disabilities were objects of pity, not people with self-respect.22 
In this mode of thinking, people with disabilities need protec-
tion, not rights. Guardianship is the primary mechanism through 
which states have provided this protection; it is a mechanism 
that, at least in its most complete form, the CRPD, and Article 
12, seeks to limit significantly.23
frOM guarDianship tO suppOrteD DecisiOn MaKing
Guardianship is a form of surrogate decision making, usually 
imposed after a court proceeding, that substitutes as decision 
maker another individual (the guardian) for the individual in 
question (called variously the ward or the allegedly incapacitated 
person). Full or plenary guardianship may or may not provide 
protection to the individual with a disability — there are numer-
ous examples of guardians who have taken advantage of, ignored, 
or otherwise failed to serve the interests of the person they were 
supposedly protecting — but even when it is functioning as 
intended it evokes a kind of “civil death”24 for the individual, who 
is no longer permitted to participate in society without media-
tion through the actions of another if at all. Plenary guardianship 
falsely assumes that incapacity for individuals with disabilities is 
an all or nothing proposition; that where found it exists in all areas 
of an individual’s life; and that, once found to exist the individual 
(especially one with an intellectual disability) will not regain 
capacity at some later time. It fails to recognize that people with 
disabilities, like people without disabilities, have areas of varying 
capacity, in different areas of their lives, and at different times.25
In recent years, some states have begun to move away from 
plenary guardianship as providing more protection than the indi-
vidual with disability needs, and as being far from the least restric-
tive manner in which to provide it.26 Alternatives such as durable 
powers-of-attorney, advance directives, health care proxies, 
representative payee regimes, direct bank deposit systems, and 
other modalities can provide more targeted assistance to the 
individual and at the same time avoid the stigma and indignity 
of the individual being determined incompetent (or lacking in 
capacity) for all purposes. Even when some might believe that 
some form of guardianship is appropriate, limited or partial 
guardianship is preferable to plenary guardianship in that the 
court specifically identifies those areas in which the guardian is 
needed and the individual retains full decision-making capacity 
in all other areas of his or her life. Other reforms have focused 
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on increasing the level of due process that a state must provide 
before a guardianship can be imposed (e.g., right to a hearing, 
legal representation, elevated standard of proof, right to confront 
witnesses and present one’s own witnesses, right to appeal, and 
provision for periodic review) and have established that the 
guardian should use the standard of “substituted judgment” 
when acting on the individual’s behalf — that is, the guardian 
should strive to determine what decision the individual would 
make if he or she could do so rather than make the choice that 
the guardian believes is in the individual’s best interest.
Important as these reforms of guardianship have been, how-
ever, they still accept the predominance of a legal regime that 
locates decision making in the surrogate or guardian and not 
in the individual being assisted. In contrast, supported decision 
making, which Article 12 embraces, retains the individual as the 
primary decision maker, while recognizing that the individual 
with a disability may need some assistance — and perhaps a 
great deal of it — in making and communicating a decision. The 
paradigm shift reflected in the move from substitute to supported 
decision making aims to retain the individual as the primary 
decision maker but recognizes that an individual’s autonomy can 
be expressed in multiple ways, and that autonomy itself need not 
be inconsistent with having individuals in one’s life to provide 
support, guidance and assistance to a greater or lesser degree, so 
long as it is at the individual’s choosing.
suppOrteD DecisiOn-MaKing
Supported decision-making can be defined as a series of rela-
tionships, practices, arrangements, and agreements, of more or 
less formality and intensity, designed to assist an individual with 
a disability to make and communicate to others decisions about 
the individual’s life. Some of the above alternatives to guard-
ianship could be part of a supported decision-making regime, 
though, to the extent they involve the individual with a disability 
identifying someone else as authorized to speak for him or her, 
they can move into a form of substituted decision-making (albeit 
one that is less restrictive of the individual’s liberty than guard-
ianship). A purer form of supported decision-making would rely 
on peer support (for example, ex-users of psychiatric services 
for people with psycho-social disabilities), community support 
networks and personal assistance,27 so-called natural supports 
(family, friends), or representatives (pursuant to a representa-
tion agreement28) to speak with, rather than for, the individual 
with a disability. “What the Convention requires is that the 
support should be based on trust, be provided with respect and 
not against the will of the person with disabilities.”29 Countries 
such as Sweden (through its use of the “god man”30), a number 
of provinces in Canada,31 and Germany 32 have made extensive 
use of supported decision-making arrangements to greater or 
lesser degree.
Inclusion Europe, an organization that advocates for the 
human rights of individuals with intellectual disabilities, has 
issued a Position Paper in which it identifies eight key elements 
of a system of supported decision-making:
•	 Promotion and support of self-advocacy.
•	 Using mainstream mechanisms for the protection of the 
best interests of a person. Accessibility and accommodation  
are important.
•	 Replacing traditional guardianship by a system of sup-
ported decision-making (recognizing that there needs to be 
a transition period from guardianship to support)
•	 Supporting decision-making. One should look to a formal 
system of support with registered supporters only for 
“essential and important decisions of legal relevance.” For 
many everyday decisions, informal support networks are 
sufficient and should be used wherever possible.
•	 Selection and registration of support persons. Jurisdictions 
need a registration system to reassure those who come into 
contact with persons with disabilities that the supporters are 
authorized to assist them. Such a system can also facilitate  
the training individuals will need.
•	 Overcoming communication barriers. Augmentative and 
alternative means of communication must be used when 
necessary.
•	 Preventing and resolving conflicts between supporter and 
supported person.
•	 Implementing safeguards. These safeguards must ensure that 
there is a level of proportionality in the support provided.33
Michael Bach has identified three common elements to 
supported decision-making models in Canada: (1) they are 
based on a set of guiding principles that emphasize the person 
with disability’s autonomy, presumption of capacity, and right 
to make decisions on an equal basis with others; (2) they rec-
ognize that a person’s intent can form the basis of a decision-
making process that does not entail removal of the individual’s 
decision-making rights; and (3) they acknowledge that individuals 
“The paradigm shift reflected in the move from 
substitute to supported decision making aims to retain  
the individual as the primary decision maker but 
recognizes that an individual’s autonomy can be expressed 
in multiple ways….”
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with disabilities will often need assistance in decision-making 
through such means as interpreter assistance, facilitated com-
munication, assistive technologies and plain language.34
Supported decision making thus permits vindication of 
Article 12’s imperative that all people with disabilities retain 
their legal capacity, even those who may need significant and 
intensive support to effectuate it. But whether countries move 
toward adopting it in lieu of substituted decision-making regimes 
depends in the first instance on how they interpret their practices 
with respect to Article 12 and how treaty bodies and non-govern-
mental organizations respond to those interpretations.
iMpleMenting suppOrteD DecisiOn-MaKing unDer 
article 12: the harD part begins
Under Article 4 of the CRPD, States Parties are obligated “to 
adopt all appropriate legislative, administrative and other mea-
sures for the implementation of the rights” in the CRPD and “to 
take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or 
abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices that con-
stitute discrimination against persons with disabilities.”35 To the 
extent a state provides only for plenary guardianship and makes 
no provision to assist people 
with disabilities to obtain the 
supports they need for decision-
making, their laws would seem 
in clear violation of Article 12.
Article 34 of the CRPD 
created an expert committee, 
the Committee on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities 
(“the Committee”), to review 
and comment upon the activi-
ties of States Parties to the 
CRPD.36 Pursuant to Article 
35 (1), States Parties must file 
with the Committee “a com-
prehensive report on measures 
taken to give effect to its obli-
gations under [the CRPD] and 
on the progress made in that 
regard” within two years after 
the CRPD enters into force 
for that country.37 To date, 
the Committee has met for six 
sessions, with a seventh sched-
uled for April 16-20, 2012.38 
The Committee has adopted 
Concluding Observations on two countries — Tunisia (at its 
Fifth Session) and Spain (at its Sixth Session) — and has 
received reports from 26 other countries (or sub-country entities) 
as of the upcoming Seventh Session. At the Seventh Session, the 
Committee expects to adopt Concluding Observations on Peru, 
and will adopt a list of issues for Argentina, China and Hungary. 
Thus, the work of interpreting and implementing the CRPD is 
in its very early stages.
The States Parties reports to the Committee from Tunisia and 
Spain reflect that those countries’ governments may not truly 
understand the difference between substituted and supported 
decision-making. Tunisia reported that it permits guardianship 
on the grounds of “insanity, mental impairment or profligacy.”39 
The State said nothing about whether it provided for supported 
decision-making or, if not, what its plans were for moving 
toward adoption of such a scheme. The report on Tunisia by 
the International Disability Alliance noted that “Tunisia does 
not understand supported decision-making,”40 and another non-
governmental organization, Atlas Council, also was critical of 
Tunisia’s compliance with Article 12.41 Tunisia’s response to the 
Committee’s List of issues (which included questions regarding 
the application of legal capacity, the kinds of guardianship, and 
whether there were any measures to move toward supported 
decision making) showed no greater understanding of the issue.
In its Country Report, Spain, in Paragraph 53, claimed to be in 
compliance with Article 12(3)’s requirement of providing access 
to supports because it had guardianship statutes!42 It reported 
that a finding of incapacity could be made on the basis that 
the person could not act “unaided.”43 It proposed to change its 
terminology from deprivation of legal capacity to modification 
of legal capacity, maintaining that this change in nomenclature 
would constitute compliance with the CRPD.44 The non-govern-
mental organization CERMI45 stated more directly that Spanish 
laws did not provide for sup-
ported decision-making.46 Once 
again, the Committee’s list of 
issues identified guardianship 
practices as a cause for concern 
under Article 12; it requested 
Spain to report on the number 
of people under guardianship 
and the number of rulings mod-
ifying an individual’s capacity 
to act; to explain how an indi-
vidual subject to guardianship 
was sufficiently protected given 
the absence of statutory lan-
guage addressing the guardian’s 
potential undue influence on 
or conflict of interest with the 
ward; and to report on any 
measures designed to replace 
substituted decision-making 
with supported decision-mak-
ing.47 Spain’s response essen-
tially indicated that it is the 
court’s responsibility to protect 
the interest of the individual 
under guardianship.48
Notwithstanding these disappointing state reports, the good 
news is that the Committee’s Concluding Observations for both 
Tunisia and Spain reflect its understanding of Article 12 and its 
commitment to keep the focus on supported decision-making. 
At its Fifth Session, with regard to Tunisia’s compliance with 
Article 12, the Committee stated that it was “concerned that no 
measures have been undertaken to replace substitute decision-
making by supported decision making in the exercise of legal 
capacity” and went on to recommend that Tunisia review its 
guardianship laws “and take action to develop laws and policies 
to replace regimes of substitute decision-making by supported 
“To the extent a state 
provides only for plenary 
guardianship and makes no 
provision to assist people 
with disabilities to obtain 
the supports they need 
for decision-making, their 
laws would seem in clear 
violation of Article 12.”
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decision-making.”49 It added that relevant public officials and 
other stakeholders should receive training on this issue. At its 
Sixth Session, the Committee made the same recommendation to 
Spain in its Concluding Observations regarding the review of state 
guardianship laws and their replacement by supported decision 
making (adding that the latter “respects the person’s autonomy, 
will and preferences.”).50 In preparation for the upcoming 
Seventh Session, in which it expects to issue its Concluding 
Observations on Peru, the Committee propounded among its list 
of issues a question that asked the state to: indicate the number 
of people with disabilities under guardianship (as a percentage 
of all people with disabilities in the country): provide informa-
tion on the legal criteria for guardianship and any procedures 
for challenging decisions ordering it; and clarify the meaning of 
the concept of people “unable to look after themselves due to a 
mental or physical disability.”51
Furthermore, at least some of the countries who have filed 
reports but that have not yet been on the Committee’s agenda do 
seem to recognize that their existing legislation or practice is at 
odds with Article 12. For example, Argentina has reported that 
its legislation does not comport with Article 12 because it does 
not provide for supported decision-making.52 Hungary reported 
on a statute that adopted provisions abolishing guardianship in 
favor of supported decision-making, but noted that the statute 
did not come into force.53 Both Australia54 and Austria55 con-
tend that substituted decision making is used as a last resort. 
Ireland has identified legal capacity as a crucial issue to address 
in connection with its efforts to ratify the CRPD, recognizing 
that its 1871 Lunacy Regulations are in dire need of attention.56
Outside of the CRPD process, other countries are making 
strides toward addressing their laws for protecting the legal capac-
ity of individuals with disabilities. According to the website of 
Mental Disability Advocacy Centre (“MDAC”), an organization 
that closely monitors developments in Europe in the area of legal 
capacity, Bulgaria, which only recently ratified the CRPD, has 
formed a task force on legal capacity law reform.57 The Czech 
Republic recently enacted (February 20, 2012) a new civil code 
that introduces supported decision making and views restriction 
on legal capacity as a last resort. According to MDAC, the Czech 
Republic is the first country to enact legal capacity reform based 
on the CRPD.58
cOnclusiOn: next steps
To be sure, the above actions are nascent, and, in some cases, 
seem to represent a “two steps forward, one step back” approach 
to the legislative and regulatory change needed to implement 
Article 12. Nevertheless, states interested in complying with 
Article 12, or at least assessing the extent to which their exist-
ing legislation falls short of its mandate, can look to a variety 
of sources for inspiration in addition to the efforts the above 
states are undertaking. Even before the CRPD was adopted, the 
Montreal Declaration on Intellectual Disabilities, issued in 2004, 
called for supported decision making for people with intellectual 
disabilities.59 As noted above,60 the International Disability 
Alliance has issued a Legal Opinion on Article 12. The United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights’ Thematic Study 
on enhancing awareness and understanding of the CRPD sets out 
clear (if not uncontroversial) views about Article 12’s reach.61 
More recently, the European Commissioner for Human Rights’ 
report, Who Gets to Decide?, calls on member states of the 
Council of Europe to abolish mechanisms for full incapacitation 
and plenary guardianship and adopt supported decision-making 
standards.62 Entities as disparate as a Surrogate Court judge in 
New York City63 and the Inter-American system’s Committee for 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Persons 
with Disabilities64 have cited to Article 12 as persuasive authority 
in examining, respectively, a guardianship proceeding and the 
meaning of the Inter-American disability convention. Litigation 
brought before domestic courts and human rights commissions 
and courts; conferences and workshops featuring experts from 
around the world; foundations supporting international dis-
ability rights; non-governmental organizations (including those 
producing alternative reports for states reporting to the CRPD’s 
Committee); and, perhaps most importantly, people with disabil-
ities themselves are important resources for assisting states that 
truly want to understand what supported decision making really 
means and why it is critical if Article 12 is to be implemented.
In addition, as the Committee itself has recognized, it is crit-
ical that states provide training for policy-makers and relevant 
stakeholders (including people with disabilities themselves, as 
well as governmental officials, health care personnel, and the 
business community, who come into contact with people with 
disabilities) on the meaning of supported decision-making — 
training that is concrete and practical as well as grounded in a 
solid philosophical and legal framework of autonomy, equality 
and non-discrimination. The reports of states that think they 
are providing supported decision making through guardianship 
suggest that there is much training work to accomplish. But 
even if supported decision-making is a relatively new concept 
within international human rights, it has been operating in 
some countries, such as Canada, for over 20 years. There is 
wisdom to be tapped.
The responsibility for implementation of the CRPD is not 
limited to the actions of States Parties. Article 33’s requirement 
that States Parties establish national implementation and monitor-
ing mechanisms, with participation by civil society (including 
people with disabilities and their representative organizations), 
provides an opportunity for individuals and groups to keep a 
watch on states’ compliance with the Convention, and can provide 
an important source of information to the Committee. Finally, 
for those states that adopt the Optional Protocol,65 the filing of 
individual complaints can serve to encourage compliance with 
the CRPD.66
Enacting appropriate state legislation, and monitoring compli-
ance with the CRPD, will not transform decision-making regimes 
from substituted to supported decision-making overnight, but they 
are a start. The human rights of people with disabilities demand 
that we not delay in making sure the paradigm shift represented 
by Article 12 becomes a reality.
Endnotes on page 72 
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